The hidden-action model captures a fundamental problem of principal-agent theory and provides an optimal sharing rule when only the outcome but not the effort can be observed (Holmström in Bell J Econ 10(1):74, 1979). However, the hidden-action model builds on various explicit and also implicit assumptions about the information of the contracting parties. This paper relaxes key assumptions regarding the availability of information included in the hidden-action model in order to study whether and, if so, how fast the optimal sharing rule is achieved and how this is affected by the various types of information employed in the principal-agent relation. Our analysis particularly focuses on information about the environment and about feasible actions for the agent. We follow an approach to transfer closed-form mathematical models into agent-based computational models and show that the extent of information about feasible options to carry out a task only has an impact on performance if decision makers are well informed about the environment, and that the decision whether to perform exploration or exploitation when searching for new feasible options only affects performance in specific situations. Having good information about the environment, on the contrary, appears to be crucial in almost all situations.

隐藏行动模型捕获了委托代理理论的一个基本问题，并在仅观察到结果而不是努力的情况下提供了最优的共享规则（Holmströmin Bell J Econ 10（1）：74，1979）。但是，隐藏行动模型建立在有关缔约方信息的各种显式和隐式假设的基础上。本文放宽了关于隐式行动模型中所包含信息的可用性的主要假设，以研究是否以及（如果这样）达到最佳共享规则的速度以及该规则如何受到委托人所使用的各种信息的影响。 -代理关系。我们的分析特别着重于有关环境和代理商可采取的措施的信息。我们采用了一种将封闭形式的数学模型转换为基于主体的计算模型的方法，并且表明，只有在决策者充分了解环境的情况下，有关执行任务的可行方案的信息范围才会对性能产生影响，并且在寻找新的可行方案时进行勘探还是开采的决定仅会影响特定情况下的性能。相反，在几乎所有情况下，拥有良好的环境信息似乎至关重要。并且在寻找新的可行方案时是进行勘探还是开采的决定仅会影响特定情况下的性能。相反，在几乎所有情况下，拥有良好的环境信息似乎至关重要。并且在寻找新的可行方案时是进行勘探还是开采的决定仅会影响特定情况下的性能。相反，在几乎所有情况下，拥有良好的环境信息似乎至关重要。