We use new firm-level data from Chile to document resource misallocation in favor of politically connected firms during the transition from dictatorship to democracy. We find that firms with links to the Pinochet regime (1973–1990) were relatively unproductive and benefited from resource misallocation under dictatorship, and those distortions persisted into democracy. We show that, after learning that the dictatorship was going to end, firms in the dictator’s network increased their productive capacity, experienced higher profits, and obtained more loans from the main state-owned bank. We test for different explanations and provide suggestive evidence consistent with connected firms aiming to shield their market position for the transition to democracy.

中文翻译：

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失去独裁者：政治过渡期间的公司

我们使用来自智利的新公司级数据来记录资源配置不当，以支持从专政到民主过渡期间存在政治联系的公司。我们发现，与皮诺切特政权有联系的公司（1973-1990年）相对而言没有生产力，并从独裁统治下的资源分配不善中受益，这些扭曲现象一直持续到民主制。我们发现，在得知独裁统治将要结束之后，独裁者网络中的企业提高了生产能力，获得了更高的利润，并从主要国有银行获得了更多的贷款。我们测试了不同的解释，并提供了与关联公司一致的暗示性证据，这些公司旨在保护其向民主过渡的市场地位。