Hereditary leadership has been an important feature of the political landscape throughout history. This paper argues that hereditary leadership is like a relational contract which improves policy incentives. We assemble a unique dataset on leaders between 1874 and 2004 in which we classify them as hereditary leaders based on their family history. The core empirical finding is that economic growth is higher in polities with hereditary leaders but only if executive constraints are weak. Moreover, this holds across of a range of specifications. The finding is also mirrored in policy outcomes which affect growth. In addition, we find that hereditary leadership is more likely to come to an end when the growth performance under the incumbent leader is poor.

中文翻译：

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遗传规则的逻辑：理论与证据

在整个历史上，世袭领导一直是政治格局的重要特征。本文认为，世袭领导就像关系契约，可以改善政策激励。我们在1874年至2004年之间收集了有关领导者的独特数据集，根据他们的家族历史将他们归类为世袭领导者。核心的经验发现是，在世袭领导人的领导下，经济增长更高，但前提是执行限制很弱。此外，这涵盖了一系列规范。这一发现也反映在影响增长的政策成果中。此外，我们发现，当任领导者的成长表现不佳时，世袭领导者更有可能结束。