ABSTRACT

This article raises the issue of why the idea of a ‘deal’ has become so prevalent in the discussion of political matters and policy proposals associated with future economic developments. It does this by linking the deal with several features of market design. Principal amongst these are game theory and matching algorithms. The Barker-Thompson Rule is presented as an example of a particular type of market construction operating in a game theoretic context, while the ‘matching engine’ is explored in a variety of contexts where it is argued to have become a standardized technique indicating to a possible reshaping of the economic terrain more generally. The consequences of these developments and trends are the emergence of a ‘dealing culture’ that threatens to overwhelm other forms of decision-making and consume the policy-making environment with the immediacy of its dealing logic.

摘要

本文提出了一个问题，为什么“交易”的思想在与未来经济发展有关的政治问题和政策建议的讨论中如此盛行。它通过将交易与市场设计的多个功能联系起来来实现此目的。其中最主要的是博弈论和匹配算法。Barker-Thompson规则是作为一种特定类型的市场结构在博弈论背景下运作的示例而提出的，而“匹配引擎”是在各种情况下进行探索的，在这些情况下，它已成为表明技术创新的标准技术。更广泛地重塑经济领域。