External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAI) alleged to have provided faulty credit ratings to Enron in 2001 prompted a measured US legal response. ECAIs are said to have played an enabling role in the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) to raise questions over the effectiveness of this early regulatory initiative. The EU also responded, albeit later, as a direct response to the GFC. External gatekeepers at various levels have been widely criticised in the ongoing GFC, with some facing serious litigation, but ECAIs have got off relative lightly in relation to these others, considering the important role they played in the crisis. This has led to massive appeals to hold ECAIs more accountable. The main ECAIs have consistently and effectively disclaimed liability and staved off litigation proceedings, while detractors have argued that, as gatekeepers and more, ECAIs should be held more accountable for their flawed ratings. This gives rise to performance expectation and accountability gaps between the two. This paper briefly traces and suggests reasons for this, and focuses on the analysis of current legal reforms with suggestions for enhancing legal accountability.

据称，外部信用评估机构（ECAI）在2001年向安然提供了错误的信用评级，这促使美国采取了有力的法律应对措施。据说ECAI在2008年全球金融危机（GFC）中发挥了推动作用，引发了人们对该早期监管计划的有效性的质疑。欧盟也作出了回应，尽管后来才对全球金融危机做出了直接回应。在正在进行的GFC中，各级外部守门人受到了广泛的批评，其中一些面临着严峻的诉讼，但是考虑到他们在危机中所起的重要作用，ECAI相对于其他人而言相对较轻。这导致了要求ECAI承担更大责任的大规模呼吁。主要的ECAI始终有效地放弃了责任并避免了诉讼程序，而批评者则认为，作为守门员和更多人，ECAI应该对其有缺陷的评级承担更多责任。这引起了两者之间的绩效期望和责任差距。本文简要地追踪并提出了这样做的原因，并着重于分析当前的法律改革并提出加强法律责任的建议。