ABSTRACT

This article explores the effects of the bonus cap rule on UK banks to assess its impact on incentives faced by senior managers to make risky decisions. It is demonstrated that the ratio of variable to fixed remuneration is only one of the factors that determine the intensity of financial incentives to make risky decisions. More crucially, the steps taken by major UK banks to evade the effects of the cap by introducing fixed pay allowances, which are paid in shares but are legally structured as fixed remuneration, have created additional risk-taking incentives. Indeed, it is shown that paying part of executive remuneration in shares as such, is a significant driver of risk-taking. It follows that there is no reason to believe that the bonus cap has achieved any improvement in incentives and, therefore, that EU law’s emphasis on the ratio of variable to fixed remuneration is misplaced.

摘要

本文探讨了奖金上限规则对英国银行的影​​响，以评估其对高级管理人员面临的风险决策动机的影响。事实证明，浮动薪酬与固定薪酬的比率只是决定财务激励措施做出风险决策强度的因素之一。更重要的是，英国主要银行采取的通过引入固定薪酬津贴来规避上限的措施，这些津贴以股票形式支付，但在法律上规定为固定薪酬，这产生了额外的冒险动机。实际上，事实证明，以股份形式支付部分高管薪酬是冒险的重要驱动力。因此，没有理由相信奖金上限在激励措施方面取得了任何进步，因此，