ABSTRACT

A keynote policy in the United Kingdom since the financial crisis has been to ‘ring-fence’ retail banks into separate subsidiaries, so-called ‘ring-fenced bodies’ (‘RFBs’). To protect vital retail banking services from risk elsewhere in the banking group, the ring-fencing framework deploys a range of regulatory tools to credibly insulate the RFB. However, directors of the RFB’s parent company have an interest in undermining the ring-fence, and directors of RFBs have the discretion to do so. UK policymakers therefore acknowledge that the RFB’s directors must be able to take decisions ‘independently’ of the parent company. This article argues that, because UK corporate law generates accountability to the parent company, RFB directors remain accountable to parent company directors from whom they are supposed to be independent. The interplay between incomplete and indeterminate regulatory obligations and the incentives generated by ring-fence governance together compromise the credibility of the ring-fencing regime.

摘要

自金融危机以来，英国的一项主要政策是将零售银行“围栏”成独立的子公司，即所谓的“围栏机构”（RFBs）。为了保护重要的零售银行服务免受银行部门其他地方的风险，环网框架部署了一系列监管工具来可靠地隔离RFB。但是，RFB母公司的董事有兴趣破坏栅栏，RFB的董事可以酌情决定这样做。因此，英国政策制定者承认，RFB的董事必须能够“独立”于母公司做出决定。本文认为，由于英国公司法产生了对母公司的问责制，RFB董事仍应对本应独立的母公司董事负责。