ABSTRACT

We consider the corporate governance challenge of protecting outside investors in listed, controlled firms. We argue that outside investors in European listed firms with controlling shareholders are poorly protected compared to US investors because the distinct European approach to the protection of investors, based on empowering active shareholders rather than shielding passive investors, is not well suited for controlled, listed firms. This approach translates into a lack of definition and development of specific fiduciary duties of the controlling shareholders towards market investors. Moreover, European jurisdictions have developed strong voice rights for active shareholders, which tend to play in favour of controlling shareholders and organised minorities but are not effective for protecting passive investors and limit their exit options. This explains why shareholder protection in European jurisdictions can be considered high, while outside investors’ protection can be considered low at the same time, generating a ‘strong shareholders, weak outside investors’ problem.

摘要

我们认为公司治理面临的挑战是保护上市受控公司中的外部投资者。我们认为，与美国投资者相比，拥有控股股东的欧洲上市公司的外部投资者受到的保护较差，因为欧洲基于保护主动投资者而不是屏蔽被动投资者的独特的投资者保护方法不适用于受控制的上市公司。这种方法导致缺乏对控股股东对市场投资者的特定信托义务的定义和发展。此外，欧洲司法管辖区为主动股东建立了强大的话语权，这些权利往往有利于控股股东和有组织的少数群体，但对保护被动投资者并限制其退出选择权却无效。