ABSTRACT

Activist hedge funds increasingly seek and secure board representation in public companies. Representation on target boards may signal a longer-term commitment to target companies that can mitigate some of the typical criticisms of traditional hedge fund activism, such as short-termism. Hedge funds may hold shares for longer periods when they obtain board seats and often become heavily involved in corporate strategy and operations. This article argues that the phenomenon of activist board representation has created an active market for corporate quasi-control, defined as power that is greater than influence but that falls short of actual corporate control. It also discusses recent innovations in activist tactics which can promote the market for corporate quasi-control such as ‘wolf pack activism’, where more than one hedge fund descends upon a company, and ‘golden leash’ compensation structures, which incentivise activist appointed directors to increase the share price of target companies.

摘要

维权对冲基金越来越多地寻求并确保上市公司中董事会的代表权。在目标董事会的代表可能表示对目标公司的长期承诺，可以减轻对传统对冲基金行动主义的一些典型批评，例如短期主义。当对冲基金获得董事会席位时，它们可能会持有较长时间的股份，并经常大量参与公司战略和运营。本文认为，维权董事会代表现象为公司准控制创造了一个活跃的市场，该市场被定义为大于影响力但未达到实际公司控制权的权力。它还讨论了激进主义策略的最新创新，这些创新可以促进诸如“狼群激进主义”之类的公司准控制市场，