Abstract Electoral district magnitude varies across German electoral constituencies and over legislative periods due to Germany's electoral system. The number of seats in parliament per constituency is effectively random. This setting permits us to investigate institutionally driven variations in the magnitude of individual constituencies on the allocation of federal resources to these constituencies. We analyze the causal effect of having more than one federal legislator per constituency on federal government resources by exploiting information from 1,379 constituencies from 1998 to 2017. More federal legislators per constituency lead to statistically significantly more employment of federal civil servants. The size of the effect is large and corresponds to about 3.5% of average employment once a constituency is represented by additional legislators from party lists. Robustness tests support our results. Further evidence points to heterogeneity of the effect: Constituencies represented by additional legislators who are experienced and who are members of larger, competing parties obtain more federal resources.

中文翻译：

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更多的联邦立法者为其选区带来更多资源：来自席位分配的外生差异的证据

摘要 由于德国的选举制度，德国不同选区和立法时期的选区规模各不相同。每个选区的议会席位数量实际上是随机的。这种设置使我们能够调查由制度驱动的个别选区在向这些选区分配联邦资源方面的规模变化。我们通过利用 1998 年至 2017 年 1,379 个选区的信息来分析每个选区拥有一名以上联邦立法者对联邦政府资源的因果影响。每个选区的联邦立法者越多，联邦公务员的就业在统计上就显着增加。效果的大小很大，大约对应于 3。一旦选区由政党名单中的其他立法者代表，平均就业人数的 5%。稳健性测试支持我们的结果。进一步的证据表明这种影响的异质性：由经验丰富且属于较大竞争政党成员的其他立法者代表的选区获得了更多的联邦资源。