This paper shows that municipalities compete excessively for donations under a unique program called Furusato Nozei (Tax payment to hometown) in Japan. Under the program, people make donations to their favorite municipalities and municipalities that have received donations give reciprocal gifts in return. This causes governments to compete for donations by setting “return rates” — the value of a gift as a percentage of the donation received. Our estimates show that, in the most likely case, this competition reduces net revenue by at least 7.5% compared to when the municipalities do not compete for donations.

中文翻译：

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政府间捐赠竞争：日本的“ Furusato Nozei”计划

本文显示，在日本称为“ Fususato Nozei”（向家乡的税款支付）的独特计划下，市政当局为争取捐赠而进行了过度竞争。根据该计划，人们向自己喜欢的城市捐款，而收到捐款的城市将​​给予互赠礼物。这导致政府通过设置“回报率”（即礼物价值占所收到捐赠的百分比）来竞争捐赠。我们的估算表明，与市政当局不竞争捐赠的情况相比，这种竞争最有可能使净收入减少至少7.5％。