In this paper, I build a model of firms’ growth with heterogeneous entrepreneurs where audits for taxes are conditioned either on sales or employees and where entrepreneurs negotiate a bribe in exchange of a tax rebate when audited by tax inspectors. I show that the impact differential between the two auditing strategies depends on the regulation environment of a country. The model is calibrated and validated using firm-level data from Uganda. The model replicates well the Ugandan size distribution of firms as well as other key statistics relevant for the counterfactual experiments. Simulations show that, in a situation where Uganda could fully eradicate tax evasion and used the recouped taxes to subsidise production, productivity per worker could increase by as much as 45%. I also show that there could be a 16% annual gain in productivity per worker solely by conditioning audits on sales rather than on employees in Uganda.

中文翻译：

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税收门槛执行不完善：对效率的影响

在这篇论文中，我建立了一个企业成长模型，其中有异质企业家，其中税收审计以销售额或雇员为条件，企业家在接受税务检查员审计时协商贿赂以换取退税。我表明两种审计策略之间的影响差异取决于一个国家的监管环境。该模型使用来自乌干达的公司级数据进行校准和验证。该模型很好地复制了乌干达公司的规模分布以及与反事实实验相关的其他关键统计数据。模拟表明，在乌干达可以完全杜绝逃税现象并用收回的税收补贴生产的情况下，每个工人的生产率可以提高多达 45%。