Costello, Down, and Mehta (2020) trace their slider intervention to deviations from the credit line amount recommended by a credit scoring model. The deviations are followed by larger delinquency declines and bigger sales orders, and Costello et al. interpret these results using discretion-based theories. However, incremental deviations are concentrated on newer clients rather than those the lender has accumulated soft information about. Deviations also appear larger for public than private borrowers. My discussion evaluates whether these results align with discretion-based theories, and explores alternative interpretations based on salience and unique aspects of the trade credit setting. Differences in interpretation aside, the evidence is informative about technological advances in commercial lending. I conclude with an overview of several recent advances and discuss the implications for lending research.

Costello，Down和Mehta（2020）将他们的滑块干预追溯到与信用评分模型建议的信用额度金额之间的偏差。偏离之后是更大的拖欠下降和更大的销售订单，Costello等人。使用基于自由裁量权的理论来解释这些结果。但是，增量偏差主要集中在较新的客户上，而不是贷方已积累的软信息上。与公共借款人相比，公共债务偏差也更大。我的讨论评估了这些结果是否与基于自由裁量权的理论相吻合，并根据贸易信贷设置的显着性和独特性探讨了其他解释。除了解释上的差异，证据还为商业贷款的技术进步提供了信息。