This study develops a framework for the strategic interaction of firms that have to decide between adhering to and violating legislation. Depending on how deterring enforcement is various degrees of compliance with the law will arise in equilibrium. For an agency that targets a certain compliance rate more resources per firm should be allocated to industries with strong demand and high costs for adhering to legislation. Whenever some degree of non-compliance among competing firms can be expected, more inspection resources are needed in markets where products are highly differentiated and/or the number of firms is small.

中文翻译：

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受监管企业之间的均衡履约率

这项研究为必须在遵守和违反法律之间做出决定的公司的战略互动建立了一个框架。根据制止执法的方式，在平衡中会出现各种程度的遵守法律的情况。对于以特定合规率为目标的代理机构，应将每个公司的更多资源分配给需求旺盛，遵守法规成本高的行业。只要可以预期竞争企业之间会出现某种程度的不合规情况，那么在产品差异化很大和/或企业数量少的市场中，就需要更多的检查资源。