When it is impossible to identify ex post the producer of a product causing harm, or the damage caused is indivisible although caused by multiple injurers, courts must apportion the total damage among tortfeasors. In this model we examine how such liability sharing rules affect the likelihood of tacit collusion. For this we use a standard Cournot oligopoly model where firms are collectively held liable for joint harm inflicted on third parties. With repeated market interaction and grim strategies, we investigate the sustainability of collusion to derive some policy implications.

中文翻译：

---

共同伤害和责任分担的市场合谋

如果无法事后确定造成损害的产品的生产商，或者尽管造成的损害是由多个伤害者造成的，则无法确定，则法院必须在侵权人中分摊全部损害。在这个模型中，我们研究了这种责任分担规则如何影响默认勾结的可能性。为此，我们使用标准的古诺寡头模型，其中，公司集体对第三方造成的共同损害承担责任。通过反复的市场互动和严峻的策略，我们调查了合谋的可持续性，以得出一些政策含义。