To enhance the inclusiveness of Burundi’s political dialogue, Ugandan president and East African Community mediator Yoweri Museveni suggested granting temporary immunity to Burundian opponents living in exile, some of whom are wanted by the government for their participation in the May 2015 failed military coup attempt. While from a short-term conflict-settlement perspective this is a valuable suggestion, an analysis of Burundi’s previous experience with temporary immunities reveals some longer-term perverse effects. First, temporary immunity turned out to be anything but temporary. Secondly, it created an incentive structure that discouraged Burundi’s elites from launching a transitional justice process. Thirdly, despite its initial purpose, it benefited both insurgents and incumbents. Fourthly, temporary immunity offered more than mere immunity to its beneficiaries. Finally, it was a stepping stone towards long-lasting impunity for human rights atrocities. Unless lessons are learned from the past, there is reason to fear that the repeated and – once more – internationally legitimized use of temporary immunity reproduces the same perverse effects. Burundi’s past use of temporary immunity, an integral part of its larger – and initially seemingly successful – experiment of peace without truth and accountability, thus casts a dark warning shadow over Museveni’s proposal. K E Y W O R D S : Burundi, conflict, mediation, temporary immunity, impunity I N T R O D U C T I O N On 28 December 2015, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda hosted a political dialogue on the crisis in Burundi at the State House in Kampala. On 6 July 2015, Museveni had been appointed as mediator on the Burundian crisis by the East African Community (EAC). Participants included government representatives, civil society members and representatives of a variety of officially recognized political parties and other political movements based outside Burundi. The presence of the * Lecturer, Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp, Belgium. Email: stef.vandeginste@uantwerpen.be 1 The crisis was sparked by incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza’s nomination, on 25 April 2015, as presidential candidate for a third term in office. This gave rise to an internal split within Nkurunziza’s party and to unprecedented street protests in the capital city Bujumbura, culminating in a failed coup d’état attempt on 13 May 2015. One year after the start of the crisis, hundreds of people have been killed and/or tortured, while more than 200,000 refugees have left Burundi. See, in more detail, Stef Vandeginste, ‘Burundi’s Electoral Crisis: Back to Power-Sharing Politics as Usual?’ African Affairs 114(457) (2015):

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穆塞韦尼、布隆迪和 Immunité Provisoire 的反常

为增强布隆迪政治对话的包容性，乌干达总统兼东非共同体调解员约韦里·穆塞韦尼建议给予流亡布隆迪反对派临时豁免权，其中一些人因参与 2015 年 5 月未遂军事政变而被政府通缉。虽然从短期解决冲突的角度来看，这是一个宝贵的建议，但对布隆迪以往临时豁免经验的分析揭示了一些长期的不利影响。首先，临时免疫结果证明不是暂时的。其次，它创造了一种激励结构，使布隆迪的精英们不愿启动过渡时期的司法程序。第三，尽管其最初的目的，它使叛乱者和在位者都受益。第四，临时豁免不仅仅为其受益人提供豁免。最后，它是人权暴行长期逍遥法外的垫脚石。除非从过去汲取教训，否则我们有理由担心重复使用——再一次——国际上合法地使用临时豁免会产生同样的有害影响。布隆迪过去使用临时豁免权，这是其更大的——最初看似成功的——没有真相和责任的和平试验的一个组成部分，因此给穆塞韦尼的提议蒙上了一层黑暗的警告阴影。关键词：布隆迪、冲突、调解、临时豁免、有罪不罚 引言 2015 年 12 月 28 日，乌干达总统约韦里·穆塞韦尼 (Yoweri Museveni) 在坎帕拉州议会大厦主持了一场关于布隆迪危机的政治对话。2015 年 7 月 6 日，穆塞韦尼被东非共同体（EAC）任命为布隆迪危机的调解人。参与者包括政府代表、民间社会成员以及各种官方认可的政党和布隆迪以外的其他政治运动的代表。* 比利时安特卫普大学发展政策与管理学院讲师。电子邮件：stef.vandeginste@uantwerpen.be 1 2015 年 4 月 25 日，现任总统皮埃尔·恩库伦齐扎 (Pierre Nkurunziza) 被提名为第三届总统候选人，引发了这场危机。这导致恩库伦齐扎党内的内部分裂以及首都布琼布拉空前的街头抗议，最终导致 2015 年 5 月 13 日未遂政变。 危机开始一年后，数百人被杀害和/或遭受酷刑，而超过 200,000 名难民已离开布隆迪。更详细地参见 Stef Vandeginste，“布隆迪的选举危机：像往常一样恢复权力分享政治？” 非洲事务 114(457) (2015)：