This paper investigates how the presence of social capital affects the externality arising from status-seeking preference as a parable for inefficient antagonistic behavior. It is assumed that the stock of social capital accumulates through the strategic interaction among a finite number of rational, infinitely-lived individuals. Using a differential game, we show that there are two types of Markov perfect equilibrium strategy, of which one leads a society to zero social capital, while the other leads to the satiation level of social capital. When there is an unstable interior steady state, there is a threshold: with any initial stock of social capital above (below) that, society is able to build social capital (get stuck in a poverty trap of null social capital). In the latter case, the intervention of governments is called upon, because social welfare in the poverty trap is less than that in the social capital-rich society.

中文翻译：

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社会资本与地位外部性

本文研究了社会资本的存在如何影响地位寻求偏好所产生的外部性，作为低效对抗行为的比喻。假设社会资本的存量是通过有限数量的理性、无限生命个体之间的战略互动而积累起来的。通过微分博弈，我们证明了马尔可夫完美均衡策略有两种类型，一种导致社会资本为零，另一种导致社会资本满足水平。当存在不稳定的内部稳定状态时，存在一个阈值：任何高于（低于）该阈值的社会资本初始存量，社会都能够建立社会资本（陷入无效社会资本的贫困陷阱）。在后一种情况下，需要政府的干预，