Political constitutionalism is a major area of inquiry in contemporary constitutional discourse. A significant and increasingly central aspect of political constitutionalism is pre-enactment political review: laws being reviewed for constitutionality or rights compliance by parliament or the executive. This institution is said to be a good augmentation of, or even replacement for, the institution of judicial review, and it is said to bring with it a host of normative benefits. In this article, we wish to highlight an under-explored dark side to pre-enactment review. By undertaking a comparative analysis of functional pre-enactment review in several similar jurisdictions—Canada, New Zealand, and the UK—we contrast these systems, and the ordinary failings they display, with the much deeper problems of pre-enactment review in Ireland and Japan. These latter jurisdictions, we argue, not only fail to instantiate the benefits of pre-enactment review but in fact show that, in the right circumstances, pre-enactment review can have negative effects that are antithetical to the goals and values of political constitutionalism. We call this phenomenon “shadow constitutional review,” and suggest that it adds a layer of complexity and nuance to contemporary discussions of political constitutionalism.

中文翻译：

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影子宪法审查：爱尔兰和日本立法前政治审查的阴暗面

政治宪政主义是当代宪政话语的一个主要研究领域。政治宪政的一个重要且日益核心的方面是颁布前的政治审查：议会或行政部门正在审查法律的合宪性或权利遵守情况。据说该制度是司法审查制度的一个很好的补充甚至替代品，据说它带来了许多规范性好处。在本文中，我们希望强调颁布前审查中未被充分探索的阴暗面。通过对几个类似司法管辖区（加拿大、新西兰和英国）的功能性颁布前审查进行比较分析，我们将这些制度及其显示的普通失败与爱尔兰和英国的颁布前审查更深层次的问题进行了对比。日本。我们认为，后一种司法管辖区不仅没有体现颁布前审查的好处，而且事实上表明，在适当的情况下，颁布前审查可能会产生与政治立宪主义的目标和价值观背道而驰的负面影响。我们称这种现象为“影子宪法审查”，并认为它为当代政治宪政的讨论增加了一层复杂性和细微差别。