This article discusses the impact of citizen participation and elite cooperation in constitution-making on the deepening of an already existing electoral democracy. It argues that while direct citizen involvement in the drafting of constitutions may be desirable on normative grounds or necessary for pragmatic reasons, only cooperation among a plurality of elected political representatives at the constitution-making stage is likely to improve the liberal dimension of democracy after the enactment of the new constitution. Inclusive constitutional agreements at the level of representative elites not only establish legal limits on state action but may also provide opposition parties and citizens alike with the means to make institutional constraints on executive power and civil liberties effective. This effect is usually observed during the early years of life of the new constitution, when the balance of power among the political forces that created the constitution tends to remain stable. I find preliminary support for this argument analyzing aggregate data and selected case studies from all episodes of democratic constitution-making in the world between 1900 and 2015.

中文翻译：

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制宪与自由民主：公民和代议制精英的作用

本文讨论了公民参与和精英合作在制宪过程中对深化现有选举民主的影响。它争辩说，虽然直接公民参与制定宪法的起草可能是可取的，但在规范的原因或必要的原因中可能是可取的，但在宪法制定阶段的多个选举政治代表中只有合作可能会改善民主之后的自由维度新宪法的制定。代表精英层面的包容性宪法协议不仅对国家行动建立了法律限制，而且还可以为反对党和公民等提供手段，使对行政权力和公民自由的制度限制有效。这种影响通常在新宪法的早期观察到，当时创建宪法的政治力量之间的权力平衡趋于保持稳定。我通过分析 1900 年至 2015 年间世界上所有民主制宪事件的汇总数据和选定案例研究，发现对这一论点的初步支持。