We model how a technology that perfectly predicts one of two stochastic demand shocks alters the character and sustainability of collusion. Our results show that mechanisms that reduce firms’ uncertainty about the true level of demand have ambiguous welfare implications for consumers and firms alike. An exogenous improvement in firms’ ability to predict demand may make collusion possible where it was previously unsustainable or more profitable where it previously existed. However, an increase in transparency also may make collusion impracticable where it had been possible. The intuition for this ambiguity is that greater clarity about the true state of demand raises the payoffs both to colluding and to cheating. Our findings on the ambiguous welfare implications of reduced uncertainty contribute to the emerging literature on how algorithms, artificial intelligence (AI), and “big data” in market intelligence applications may affect competition.

我们对能够完美预测两种随机需求冲击之一的技术如何改变合谋的性质和可持续性进行建模。我们的结果表明，减少企业对真实需求水平不确定性的机制对消费者和企业都有不明确的福利影响。公司对需求的预测能力的外在提高可能使共谋在以前不可持续的情况下成为可能，或者在以前存在的情况下更有利可图。但是，透明性的增加也可能使串通变得不可行。这种歧义的直觉是，对需求的真实状态的更加清晰会提高共谋和作弊的收益。我们关于减少不确定性对福利的含糊意义的发现有助于有关算法，