Abstract. The scale of low pay and in-work poverty affecting the bottom three deciles of the labour market highlights the weaknesses in the two main mechanisms for assisting the low-paid: the statutory minimum wage provided for by the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 and State in-work benefits, particularly Universal Credit (UC) as it operates under the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and Universal Credit Regulations 2013. Both mechanisms are failing badly. The paper argues for new approaches. On the Labour side of what may be called the Labour Law–Social Security Law interface these include reconstruction of the national minimum wage scheme in the 1998 Act so that there are two minimum wage floors: a primary floor based on the current national scheme; and a higher, secondary floor at sectoral level. Sectoral wage-setting, informed by support from a Low Pay Commission with an extended remit, could in time pave the way to wider-ranging, regulated sectoral collective bargaining and systems which align more closely and efficiently to what employers can afford, and relieve the growing fiscal pressures on in-work social security. On the Social Security side, remedial work on UC is urgently needed, particularly on the work allowances which set the earnings thresholds at which in-work State support starts to be withdrawn. If mandatory ‘progression’ requirements under the in-work progression (IWP) scheme are to continue—which is likely given the government’s concern that, without this, workers in low hours, low paid mini jobs will opt to stay parked in such highly subsidised work—then exemptions and protections need to be strengthened and put on a statutory footing (particularly for workers with family responsibilities). Introducing what would, in effect, be a ‘right not to work’ in prescribed cases—typically when requirements impact disproportionately on workers and their family members—would go some way to establishing the necessary safeguards. Clearly, both low pay mechanisms face a crisis of growing proportions: a crisis of coverage as dependence grows and newer groups look to the State for support; a fiscal crisis as costs rise and cuts to support impact on its effectiveness; and a political crisis as support for UC and the wider low pay regime erodes.

中文翻译：

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从 Mini 到 Maxi 工作？低薪、“进步”和工作职责（更难）

摘要。影响劳动力市场最底层的三个十分之一的低工资和在职贫困的规模突出了帮助低收入者的两个主要机制的弱点：1998 年《国家最低工资法》和 1998 年国家最低工资法规定的法定最低工资- 工作福利，特别是普遍信贷 (UC)，因为它根据 2012 年福利改革法案和 2013 年普遍信贷条例运作。这两种机制都失败了。该论文主张采用新方法。在可以称为《劳动法-社会保障法》界面的劳工方面，这些包括重建 1998 年法案中的全国最低工资计划，以便有两个最低工资底线：基于当前国家计划的初级底线；以及部门级别的更高的二级楼层。部门工资设定，在低薪委员会的支持下，其职权范围扩大，可以及时为范围更广、受监管的部门集体谈判和系统铺平道路，使雇主能够负担得起的范围更紧密、更有效，并缓解日益增长的财政压力。 - 工作社会保障。在社会保障方面，迫切需要对 UC 进行补救工作，特别是在工作津贴方面，该工作津贴设定了开始取消在职国家支持的收入门槛。如果在职进步 (IWP) 计划下的强制性“进步”要求要继续——这很可能是因为政府担心，如果没有这个，工作时间很短的工人，低薪的迷你工作将选择停留在如此高补贴的工作中——然后需要加强豁免和保护，并将其置于法定基础上（特别是对于有家庭责任的工人）。在规定的情况下引入实际上是“不工作的权利”——通常是当要求对工人及其家庭成员产生不成比例的影响时——将在某种程度上建立必要的保障措施。显然，这两种低工资机制都面临着越来越严重的危机：随着依赖性的增加和新的群体向国家寻求支持，覆盖面出现危机；财政危机，因为成本上升和削减以支持对其有效性的影响；随着对加州大学和更广泛的低工资制度的支持受到侵蚀，政治危机。在规定的情况下成为“不工作的权利”——通常是当要求对工人及其家庭成员产生不成比例的影响时——将有助于建立必要的保障措施。显然，这两种低工资机制都面临着越来越严重的危机：随着依赖性的增加和新的群体向国家寻求支持，覆盖面出现危机；财政危机，因为成本上升和削减以支持对其有效性的影响；随着对加州大学和更广泛的低工资制度的支持受到侵蚀，政治危机。在规定的情况下成为“不工作的权利”——通常是当要求对工人及其家庭成员产生不成比例的影响时——将有助于建立必要的保障措施。显然，这两种低工资机制都面临着越来越严重的危机：随着依赖性的增加和新的群体向国家寻求支持，覆盖面出现危机；财政危机，因为成本上升和削减以支持对其有效性的影响；随着对加州大学和更广泛的低工资制度的支持受到侵蚀，政治危机。财政危机，因为成本上升和削减以支持对其有效性的影响；随着对加州大学和更广泛的低工资制度的支持受到侵蚀，政治危机。财政危机，因为成本上升和削减以支持对其有效性的影响；随着对加州大学和更广泛的低工资制度的支持受到侵蚀，政治危机。