In R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor (Equality and Human Rights Commission Intervening) the Supreme Court held that fees for bringing claims in the employment tribunal were unlawful both under common law and as a matter of EU law. The judgment has very significant implications for any system in which the enforcement of employment or social rights is left to individual claimants, the paradigmatic model adopted in the UK. Recent government policy has ignored the public function of individual tribunal claims in delivering employment rights at the systemic level, exemplified by the theoretical assumptions and justifications which lay behind the introduction of fees. The Supreme Court’s analysis of the rule of law and the common law right of access to justice is in sharp conflict with these policies. I discuss the difference between the common law principles and the parallel principles in EU law and under Article 6 of the ECHR. The article explores the consequences of the judgment for cases rejected, dismissed or not brought at all owing to fees, and its longer-term implications for impediments to access to tribunals, all the more important with Brexit on the horizon. The judgment represents an important triumph of the rule of law over the increased marketisation of legal rights.

中文翻译：

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就业法庭费用和法治：R（Unison）诉最高法院大法官

在 R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor (Equality and Human Rights Commission Intervening) 一案中，最高法院裁定，根据普通法和欧盟法律，向就业法庭提出索赔的费用是非法的。该判决对任何将就业或社会权利的执行留给个人索赔人的制度都具有非常重要的影响，这是英国采用的典型模式。最近的政府政策忽视了个别法庭索赔在系统层面提供就业权利的公共功能，例如引入收费背后的理论假设和理由。最高法院对法治和普通法司法救助权的分析与这些政策存在尖锐冲突。我讨论了普通法原则与欧盟法律中以及欧洲人权法院第 6 条下的平行原则之间的区别。文章探讨了判决对因收费而被拒绝、驳回或根本不提起诉讼的后果，及其对进入法庭的障碍的长期影响，尤其是在英国脱欧即将到来的情况下。该判决代表了法治对法律权利日益市场化的重要胜利。