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The Strasbourg Court Meets Abusive Constitutionalism: Baka v. Hungary and the Rule of Law
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law ( IF 1.682 ) Pub Date : 2017-11-02 , DOI: 10.1007/s40803-017-0065-y
David Kosař , Katarína Šipulová

The rise of abusive constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has hit the domestic judiciaries particularly hard. Viktor Orbán expanded the size of the Constitutional Court and then packed it, made sure that he can install a new president of the Constitutional Court, ousted the Supreme Court president through a constitutional amendment, disempowered the existing judicial council and created the new institution with power over ordinary judicial appointments. Jaroslav Kaczyński followed the same playbook in Poland. While most scholars have focused primarily on effects of abusive constitutionalism upon the constitutional courts, we argue that the keys to the long-term control of the judiciary are presidents of ordinary courts and judicial councils . The dismissal of the Hungarian Supreme Court President is a perfect example of this logic—by this move Orbán got rid of the most important court president in the country, the head of the Hungarian judicial council and his most vocal critic. Yet, András Baka lodged an application to the ECtHR and won. This article analyses the Grand Chamber judgment in Baka v. Hungary, its implication for the rule of law, and the limits of what the ECtHR can achieve against abusive constitutionalism. It concludes that the Grand Chamber failed on all key fronts. It overlooked the main structural problem behind Mr. Baka’s dismissal (the broad powers of court presidents in CEE), it has blurred the Convention’s understanding of the concept of the rule of law, and it failed in delivering a persuasive judgment firmly based on the existing ECtHR’s case law .

中文翻译:

斯特拉斯堡法院遭遇滥用宪政:Baka诉匈牙利与法治

中欧和东欧(CEE)滥用宪政的兴起对国内司法机构的打击尤其严重。维克多·奥尔班(ViktorOrbán)扩大了宪法法院的规模,然后打包,确保他可以任命宪法法院的新院长,通过宪法修正案驱逐最高法院院长,取消现有司法委员会的权力,并创建具有权力的新机构超过普通的司法任命。JaroslavKaczyński在波兰也遵循了同样的剧本。虽然大多数学者主要关注滥用宪政对宪法法院的影响,但我们认为,对司法机构进行长期控制的关键是普通法院和司法委员会的院长。匈牙利最高法院院长的免职就是这种逻辑的完美例证-通过这一举动,奥尔班摆脱了该国最重要的法院院长,匈牙利司法委员会主席和他最直言不讳的批评家。然而,安德拉斯·巴卡(AndrásBaka)向欧洲人权法院提出了申请,并获胜。本文分析了大议院在Baka诉匈牙利案中的判决,其对法治的影响以及ECtHR反对滥用宪政的能力所具有的局限性。结论是,大会议厅在所有关键方面都失败了。它忽视了巴卡先生被免职背后的主要结构性问题(中欧法院院长的广泛权力),模糊了《公约》对法治概念的理解,并且未能坚定地基于现有原则做出有说服力的判决ECtHR的判例法。
更新日期:2017-11-02
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