This paper presents FENOCOP, a game-theoretic approach for solving non-cooperative planning problems that involve a set of self-interested agents. Each agent wants to execute its own plan in a shared environment but the plans may be rendered infeasible by the appearance of potential conflicts; agents are willing to coordinate their plans in order to avoid conflicts during a joint execution. In order to attain a conflict-free combination of plans, agents must postpone the execution of some of their actions, which negatively affects their individual utilities. FENOCOP is a two-level game approach: the General Game selects a Nash equilibrium among several combinations of plans, and the Scheduling Game generates, for a combination of plans, an executable outcome by introducing delays in the agents’ plans. For the Scheduling Game, we developed two algorithms that return a Pareto optimal and fair equilibrium from which no agent would be willing to deviate.

本文介绍了FENOCOP，这是一种用于解决涉及一组自私代理商的非合作计划问题的博弈论方法。每个代理都希望在共享环境中执行自己的计划，但是由于潜在冲突的出现，这些计划可能变得不可行。代理商愿意协调他们的计划，以避免在联合执行过程中发生冲突。为了实现计划的无冲突组合，代理商必须推迟执行某些行动，这会对他们的个人效用产生负面影响。菲诺这是一种两级博弈方法：“通用博弈”在多个计划组合中选择一个Nash均衡，而“调度博弈”通过将代理的计划引入延迟为计划的组合生成可执行的结果。对于计划博弈，我们开发了两种算法，可返回帕累托最优和公平均衡，没有代理会愿意偏离该均衡。