A long‐standing void in international business literature is understanding whether and how the internalization choices of competing multinational enterprises (MNEs) affect each other. This paper presents a game‐theoretic, location‐allocation mathematical model that predicts the organizational boundaries of competing MNEs. Given multiple players in the market, the game analyzes the competition between MNEs with respect to market share, yielding Nash equilibria that determine how many MNEs will be left in the market, and whether their production and marketing sites are internalized or outsourced. Results of computational experiments suggest that the internalization choices of profit maximizing MNEs that compete with each other, sharply deviate from the internalization choices ignoring such competition.

中文翻译：

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竞争中的内部化选择：一种博弈论方法

国际商业文献中长期存在的空白是了解竞争性跨国企业（MNE）的内部化选择是否以及如何相互影响。本文提出了一种博弈论，位置分配数学模型，该模型可预测竞争性跨国企业的组织边界。给定市场中有多个参与者，该游戏会分析跨国公司之间在市场份额方面的竞争，得出纳什均衡，从而确定市场上将剩下多少个跨国公司，以及其生产和销售场所是内部还是外包。计算实验结果表明，相互竞争的最大化利润的跨国公司的内部化选择与忽略这种竞争的内部化选择大相径庭。