We argue that state ownership is a crucial policy instrument for alleviating what is perhaps the most important principal–principal (PP) agency problem around the globe: private benefits of control (PBC). Our results illustrate that states reduce PBC in the companies in which they acquire controlling ownership positions. We also examine how legal and political institutions influence the extent to which states accomplish this goal. Antiself‐dealing legal regulations make states more effective in their efforts to constrain PBC, while political constraints make them less effective. Regimes with high state capacity appear not to prioritize PBC reduction. We test and corroborate these ideas in a sample of 1,354 control transactions across 54 countries.

中文翻译：

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国家所有权是否伤害或帮助了少数股东？收购控制区块的国际证据

我们认为，国家所有权是缓解全球范围内最重要的委托/代理（PP）代理问题：控制的私人利益（PBC）的重要政策工具。我们的结果表明，国家降低了获得控股权的公司的PBC。我们还将研究法律和政治制度如何影响国家实现这一目标的程度。反自我交易法律法规使国家在约束人民广播银行方面更加有效，而政治方面的限制使它们的效力下降。具有高状态能力的政权似乎没有优先考虑减少PBC。我们在54个国家/地区的1354个控制交易样本中测试和证实了这些想法。