ABSTRACT Institutional investors dissatisfied with weak firm governance can directly or indirectly intervene in management to maximise profits. However, no study has investigated the effects of such interventions on corporate governance. This study therefore examines the effect of Korean National Pension Service blockholdings on firms’ corporate governance quality in the Korean market. This setting is interesting because the market is dominated by chaebols, which have ineffective internal governance mechanisms. We find that blockholdings reduce corporate governance quality under various endogeneity checks and empirical models; this finding in an emerging market implies that regulatory authorities should support institutional blockholders’ active market participation.

中文翻译：

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机构投资者能否提高公司治理质量？来自韩国国民年金服务机构冻结的证据

摘要 机构投资者对公司治理薄弱不满意，可以直接或间接干预管理以实现利润最大化。然而，没有研究调查过此类干预对公司治理的影响。因此，本研究考察了韩国国民养老金服务公司控股对韩国市场公司治理质量的影响。这种设置很有趣，因为市场由财阀主导，财阀的内部治理机制无效。我们发现，在各种内生性检验和实证模型下，持股会降低公司治理质量；新兴市场的这一发现意味着监管机构应支持机构大股东积极参与市场。