ABSTRACT Equityholders of firms with high debt loads have an incentive to underinvest, a distortion that can be most costly for firms with attractive growth options. Using a novel patent-based measure of a firm's growth options, we find that firms issue more equity and shy away from debt financing when they have larger investment opportunities sets. The results are more pronounced among firms in patent-intensive industries. The findings suggest the existence of conflicts of interest between debtholders and equityholders. Our results are consistent with the use of conservative debt policies by technology-intensive firms to mitigate the debt overhang associated with their future growth options.

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为技术创新融资：来自专利密集型企业的证据

摘要 债务负担高的公司的股东有投资不足的动机，对于具有有吸引力的增长选择的公司来说，这种扭曲可能代价最高。使用一种基于专利的新方法衡量公司的增长选择，我们发现当公司拥有更大的投资机会集时，他们会发行更多的股权并回避债务融资。结果在专利密集型行业的公司中更为明显。调查结果表明，债权人和股东之间存在利益冲突。我们的结果与技术密集型公司使用保守的债务政策来减轻与其未来增长选择相关的债务负担是一致的。