The extent to which English law remedies injury to autonomy (ITA) as a stand-alone actionable damage in negligence is disputed. In this article I argue that the remedy available is not only partial and inconsistent (Keren-Paz in Med Law Rev, 2018) but also gendered and discriminatory against women. I first situate the argument within the broader feminist critique of tort law as failing to appropriately remedy gendered harms, and of law more broadly as undervaluing women’s interest in reproductive autonomy. I then show by reference to English remedies law’s first principles how imposed motherhood cases—Rees v Darlington and its predecessor McFarlane v Tayside Health Board—result in gender injustice when compared with other autonomy cases such as Chester v Afshar and Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust: A minor gender-neutral ITA is better remedied than the significant gendered harm of imposing motherhood on the claimant; men’s reproductive autonomy is protected to a greater extent than women’s; women’s reproductive autonomy is protected by an exceptional, derisory award. Worst of all, courts refuse to recognise imposed motherhood as detriment; and the deemed, mansplained, nonpecuniary joys of motherhood are used to offset pecuniary upkeep costs, forcing the claimant into a position she sought to avoid and thus further undermining her autonomy. The recent Singaporean case ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd, awarding compensation for undermining the claimant’s genetic affinity in an IVF wrong-sperm-mix-up demonstrates some improvement in comparison to English law, and some shared gender injustices in the context of reproductive autonomy. ACB’s analysis is oblivious to the nature of reproductive autonomy harm as gendered; and prioritises the father’s interest in having genetic affinity with the baby over a woman’s interest in not having motherhood imposed upon her.

中文翻译：

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英国和新加坡疏忽法中自主权损害补偿中的性别不公正

英国法律在多大程度上对自主权的损害（ITA）作为独立的可诉损害进行补救是有争议的。在本文中，我认为可用的补救措施不仅是局部和不一致的（Keren-Paz in Med Law Rev, 2018），而且还存在性别歧视和对妇女的歧视。我首先将这一论点置于更广泛的女权主义批评中，即侵权法未能适当地补救性别伤害，更广泛地将法律视为低估妇女对生殖自主权的兴趣。然后，我通过参考英国补救法的首要原则展示了与其他自治案件（例如 Chester v Afshar 和 Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust）相比，强加的孕产案例（Rees v Darlington 及其前身 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board）如何导致性别不公正：与将母性强加给索赔人的重大性别伤害相比，轻微的不分性别的 ITA 更能得到补救；男性的生育自主权比女性受到更大程度的保护；妇女的生育自主权受到一项特殊的、可笑的奖励的保护。最糟糕的是，法院拒绝承认强加的母性是有害的；被认为是人为伤害的非金钱的母性快乐被用来抵消金钱的维持费用，迫使索赔人陷入她试图避免的境地，从而进一步削弱了她的自主权。最近在新加坡的案件 ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd 因在试管婴儿错误精子混合中破坏索赔人的遗传亲和力而获得赔偿，这表明与英国法律相比有所改善，并且在生殖自主的背景下存在一些共同的性别不公正。ACB 的分析忽略了生殖自主性损害的性别性质；并优先考虑父亲对与婴儿具有遗传亲和力的兴趣，而不是女性对不强加给她的母性的兴趣。