We investigate experimentally how granting a manager stock ownership and the opportunity to trade shares of a company’s stock influence the manager’s effort and the overall behavior of the market for the company’s shares. In our design, managerial effort affects the fundamental value of the firm. Our findings suggest that endowing a manager with stock does not significantly increase the manager’s effort. When the manager is allowed to trade the company’s shares, however, she tends to accumulate additional shares, increase her effort, and raise company value. In all of our treatments, prices tend to reflect underlying fundamentals, and bubbles are rare.

中文翻译：

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管理激励和股价动态：一种实验方法

我们通过实验研究如何授予经理人股票所有权以及买卖公司股票的机会如何影响经理人的努力以及公司股票市场的整体行为。在我们的设计中，管理工作会影响公司的基本价值。我们的发现表明，向经理授予股票不会显着增加经理的工作量。但是，当经理被允许交易公司的股票时，她倾向于积累更多的股份，增加工作量，并提高公司价值。在我们所有的处理方法中，价格都倾向于反映基本面，并且泡沫很少见。