The macroeconomic policy "trilemma" is widely used as a framework to discuss the rationale for capital controls and monetary policy autonomy under the Bretton Woods system (1944-1971). Without denying its usefulness, I highlight two facts at odds with assumptions underlying the "trilemma" argument. First, conflicts between internal and external objectives were uncommon. Second, using quantitative credit controls allowed central banks to disconnect their interest rate from the domestic monetary policy stance. They assigned the interest rate to the external side while managing domestic credit expansion with direct quantitative controls. This paper documents that such mechanism was explicitly considered by contemporary economists and central bankers as a way to escape international financial constraints. In such an environment, capital controls were used to complement credit controls. Interest rate spreads were neither a good measure of capital controls nor of central bank autonomy.

中文翻译：

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信用控制是摆脱困境的一种手段。布雷顿森林体系的经验†

宏观经济政策“三难”被广泛用作讨论布雷顿森林体系（1944-1971）下资本管制和货币政策自治的理由的框架。在不否认其有用性的情况下，我强调了两个事实，它们与“三难”论点所依据的假设背道而驰。首先，内部目标与外部目标之间的冲突并不常见。其次，使用量化信贷控制使中央银行可以将其利率与国内货币政策立场分离。他们在直接量化控制下管理国内信贷扩张的同时，将利率分配给外部。本文证明了这种机制被当代经济学家和中央银行明确地认为是逃避国际金融约束的一种方式。在这样的环境下 资本控制被用来补充信贷控制。利率差既不是衡量资本管制的好方法，也不是中央银行自治的好方法。