We empirically compare bids (i.e. prices) from temporary partnerships (TPs), that outsource part of the contract before the auction, and firms that outsource afterwards. Using a comprehensive dataset on procurement auctions for public works in Valle d’Aosta (Italy), we find that the timing of outsourcing affects the bids and the probability of winning the auction. Specifically, TPs bid closer to the payoff maximizing offer and are more likely to win. Hence, the price paid by the public buyer is lower. These results are supported by a simple theoretical setting showing that, by pre-committing to a TP, suppliers have a lower risk of being “held up” by subcontractors than firms that outsource part of the work after the bidding phase. Our results show the advantage for TPs of freely choosing partners, size and boundaries before the auction, highlighting their potential in fostering the effective participation in public procurement procedures of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs).

我们根据经验比较临时合伙人（TP），在拍卖前将部分合同外包和在事后外包的公司的出价（即价格）。通过对瓦莱达奥斯塔（意大利）公共工程的采购拍卖的综合数据集，我们发现外包的时间会影响标书和赢得拍卖的可能性。具体而言，目标竞标者更接近使收益最大化的报价，并且更有可能获胜。因此，公共购买者支付的价格较低。这些结果得到一个简单的理论背景的支持，该理论表明，通过预先承诺一个TP，与在招标阶段之后将部分工作外包的公司相比，供应商被分包商“阻止”的风险要低。我们的结果表明，TP的优势在于拍卖前可以自由选择合作伙伴，规模和边界，