The most common pecuniary sanction, i.e. fixed-fines, places an emphasis on the severity of the crime. This fine has the problem of being either too high for poorer offenders to pay or too low for the richer offenders to be deterred. Day-fines, on the other hand, systematically account for the financial situation of the offender as well as for the severity of his offense. Consequently, it imposes equivalent burden of punishment on offenders who committed similar crimes, regardless of their wealth. However, a problem of asymmetric information is raised. Accurate financial information is essential for the efficiency of day-fines, yet its collection is costly. Day-fines receive increasing attention from policy-makers around the world. Nonetheless, it is under-researched in the law and economics literature. Therefore, this article is the first to formally analyze the problem of asymmetric information in the context of day-fines and to develop an optimal secondary enforcement system that would incentivize criminals to provide accurate information regarding their wealth.

中文翻译：

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天罚：信息不对称和二级执法系统

最常见的金钱制裁，即定额罚款，着重于犯罪的严重性。罚款的问题是，对于较贫穷的罪犯来说，这笔钱太高了，而对于那些较富有的罪犯来说，这笔钱太低了，无法阻止。另一方面，天罚系统地说明了犯罪者的经济状况以及犯罪行为的严重性。因此，它对犯下类似罪行的犯罪者施加了同等的惩罚负担，无论他们的财富如何。然而，提出了信息不对称的问题。准确的财务信息对于提高日罚款的效率至关重要，但是收集信息的成本很高。日罚款受到世界各地决策者越来越多的关注。但是，它在法律和经济学文献中研究不足。因此，