We examine the impact of the enforcement of financial regulations by the French Financial Market Authority on sanctioned firms. The early stages of the enforcement process are by law confidential, with an internal investigation and bilateral exchanges between the defendant and its regulator. The public hearing by the Enforcement Committee leads to a single publication of the decision, being the only public communication. Using an event study methodology, we find that the confidentiality of the initial steps of enforcement procedures is respected and that markets account for the publication of sanctions. Still, reactions are limited in absolute and relative terms, both compared to past studies and in terms of reputational penalty. Some parameters trigger a stronger reaction, but not the most straightforward (such as the cash fine or behavioral sanction). The results echo the reputation for leniency of sanctions (scarce procedures, lax verdicts, low fines, ending neglected by analysts and investors), despite consecutive regulatory tightenings and long procedures. They question the efficiency of enforcement.

中文翻译：

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监管制裁对上市公司的财务影响

我们研究了法国金融市场管理局执行金融法规对受制裁公司的影响。执法过程的早期阶段在法律上是机密的，内部调查以及被告与其监管者之间的双边交流。执法委员会的公开听证会导致该决定的单一公布，这是唯一的公共交流。使用事件研究方法，我们发现执行程序初始步骤的机密性得到了尊重，并且市场负责制裁的发布。尽管如此，相对于过去的研究和声誉惩罚而言，反应在绝对和相对方面都受到限制。一些参数会触发更强烈的反应，但不是最直接的方法（例如现金罚款或行为制裁）。尽管连续不断的收紧监管和漫长的程序，结果仍以宽大的制裁声名昭著（制裁程序少，判决松懈，罚款低，最终被分析家和投资者忽略）。他们质疑执法的效率。