The general public often demands more frequent audits and harsher penalties to discourage tax evasion. This paper explores how deterrence via better-equipped tax agencies interrelates with the motivation to voluntarily pay taxes, and how both factors jointly influence tax evasion. For a panel of up to 25 European countries, this paper studies aggregate implications of the Slippery Slope hypothesis of tax compliance, and contributes to the literature on the societal dimension of tax evasion. The results suggest that both higher trust in authorities and increased deterrence efforts are positively associated with tax compliance. Trust and deterrence interact and depend on each other: if trust in authorities is low, an increase in tax enforcement works best for narrowing the tax gap (and vice versa). Generally, the positive influence of trust diminishes with increasing deterrence.

中文翻译：

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强制执行税收，但要谨慎：滑坡框架的社会意义

公众通常要求更频繁的审计和更严厉的处罚，以防止逃税。本文探讨了通过装备精良的税务机构进行的威慑如何与自愿纳税的动机相关联，以及这两个因素如何共同影响逃税行为。对于由多达25个欧洲国家组成的小组，本文研究了税收遵从性滑坡假设的总体含义，并为逃税的社会维度提供了文献资料。结果表明，对当局的更高信任和更大的威慑力量与税收合规性正相关。信任与威慑相互影响并相互依赖：如果对权威的信任度较低，则增加税收执法最能缩小税收差距（反之亦然）。通常，