In E.S. v Austria, the European Court of Human Rights ruled, not for the first time, that Austria can legitimately curb free speech to protect the religious feelings of believers. In this case note on E.S., I first discuss the original Strasbourg Court judgment on insult to religious feelings: Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria. This prelude is important for at least two reasons. First, because much – though not all – of what the Court says in E.S. draws directly on Otto-Preminger. Second, since much of the scholarly lamentations on E.S. echo earlier criticism of Otto-Preminger. Having introduced the legal context in which E.S. was decided, I go on to analyze the Strasbourg Court ruling in E.S. itself. I critique the Court's reasoning for conflating two lines of case law, as this generates a couple of serious problems, which have provoked justified scholarly criticism of E.S.. Before concluding, I explore the possibility of a less contentious reading of the Strasbourg Court's judgment, cast in the language of tolerance.

中文翻译：

---

言论自由与宗教感情，续集：在 ES 诉奥地利案中诽谤先知穆罕默德

在 ES 诉奥地利案中，欧洲人权法院并非第一次裁定，奥地利可以合法地遏制言论自由以保护信徒的宗教感情。在这个关于 ES 的案例说明中，我首先讨论了斯特拉斯堡法院关于侮辱宗教感情的原始判决：Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria。这个前奏很重要，至少有两个原因。首先，因为法院在 ES 中所说的大部分（尽管不是全部）直接引用了 Otto-Preminger。其次，因为许多学术上对 ES 的哀叹呼应了早先对 Otto-Preminger 的批评。在介绍了决定 ES 的法律背景之后，我继续分析斯特拉斯堡法院对 ES 本身的裁决。我批评法院将判例法的两条线​​混为一谈的推理，因为这会产生一些严重的问题，这引起了对 ES 的合理学术批评。在结束之前，我探讨了以宽容的语言对斯特拉斯堡法院判决进行较少争议的阅读的可能性。