The UK takeover regulatory landscape must be understood in the context of the interplay between enforcement of the rules and how investors behave in the face of those rules from a corporate governance perspective. From a legal standpoint, the courts have historically never been involved in the regulation of takeover transactions in the UK. However, section 955 of the Companies Act 2006 now enables the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers to seek court enforcement when a party fails to comply with the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. Although a potentially useful mechanism to support the Panel in its administration of the Code, it was doubted whether the Panel would ever elect to rely on the provision as it involves exposing its regulatory monopoly to judicial scrutiny. The Scottish Court of Session decisions in Panel on Takeover and Mergers v. King mark the first time the Panel has chosen to rely on Section 955, in the context of enforcing the Mandatory Bid Rule. This paper analyses how this important rule is applied and enforced in practice, as well as the relationship between the Panel and the courts. The facts of the decisions also occasion consideration of an investment tactic that can be deployed to avoid triggering the Mandatory Bid Rule, namely what we define as ‘goldilocks control’.

中文翻译：

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Goldilocks (Control) and the Three Bears：收购和合并小组诉金

必须在规则执行与投资者如何从公司治理角度面对这些规则之间的相互作用的背景下理解英国的收购监管格局。从法律角度来看，法院历来从未参与监管英国的收购交易。但是，2006 年《公司法》第 955 条现在允许收购和合并小组在一方未能遵守《城市收购和合并法》时寻求法院强制执行。尽管这是一种支持专家组管理该守则的潜在有用机制，但有人怀疑专家组是否会选择依赖该条款，因为它涉及将其监管垄断暴露于司法审查之下。苏格兰高等法院在收购和合并小组 v. King 标志着专家组第一次选择依赖第 955 条，在执行强制投标规则的背景下。本文分析了这一重要规则在实践中如何应用和执行，以及专家组与法院之间的关系。这些决定的事实也促使人们考虑一种投资策略，该策略可以用来避免触发强制投标规则，即我们定义为“金发姑娘控制”。