The market discipline of creditors on the risk-taking behaviour of borrowing banks represents a long-lasting debate. Such a debate gained new attention after the post-crisis stream of reforms concerning resolution policy: creditors should be incentivized to make an optimal effort in monitoring their borrowers and, at the same time, their interests have been aligned with the social ones. Many commentators criticized such an expectation especially in the European context, arguing that the lack of credibility and excessive complexity of the resolution mechanism impair the ability and willingness of creditors to exert a disciplining role. This article aims at taking a step forward in this scientific debate, investigating whether the ability to exert disciplining activity is inherently impaired by the design of the Directive. In other words, this research wants to assess if, assuming an ideal environment, creditors would have optimal incentives to monitor banks’ behaviour and to react accordingly. To do so, the article reviews the literature on market discipline, then carries out a legal analysis of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), focusing on those norms shaping the market for bail-inable securities. Eventually, the incentives stemming from those norms are discussed, assuming an ideal environment where a bail-in is certain and credible and the market for bail-inable securities works smoothly. The analysis highlights that the incentives of creditors toward market discipline are inherently diluted by the BRRD’s legal design because of competing policy objectives pursued by the Directive. The direct normative consequence of such a finding is that enhancing information and predictability, though desirable in principle, will never lead to an optimal monitoring effort, leaving the floor to alternative rule-based strategies.

中文翻译：

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超越不可预测性的救助：债权人的激励和市场纪律

债权人对借款银行冒险行为的市场纪律是一个长期的争论。在危机后的处置政策改革之后，这样的辩论获得了新的关注：应激励债权人尽最大努力监控借款人，同时他们的利益与社会利益保持一致。许多评论家批评这种期望，尤其是在欧洲背景下，认为缺乏公信力和解决机制过于复杂，削弱了债权人发挥约束作用的能力和意愿。本文旨在在这场科学辩论中向前迈出一步，调查是否施加纪律活动的能力受到指令设计的内在损害。换句话说，本研究旨在评估，假设环境理想，债权人是否有最佳激励措施来监控银行行为并做出相应反应。为此，本文回顾了有关市场纪律的文献，然后对银行恢复和处置指令 (BRRD) 进行了法律分析，重点关注塑造可纾困证券市场的规范。最后，讨论了源自这些规范的激励措施，假设理想环境是纾困是确定和可信的，且可纾困证券市场运行平稳。分析强调，由于该指令追求的竞争性政策目标，BRRD 的法律设计本质上削弱了债权人对市场纪律的激励。