Shareholder conflicts are said to be the Achilles heel of close corporations. They materialize in different ways and shapes, mostly in the form of majority oppression, minority abuse or shareholder deadlocks. Different cognitive biases and heuristics, as shown by the behavioural law and economics movement currently so much in vogue, contribute to their emergence (such as over-optimism, strategic behaviour, availability and representativeness heuristics, information asymmetry). In international corporate law practice, depending on the concrete governance goal to be achieved, entrepreneurs employ various contractual safeguards to effectively prevent and resolve the above shareholder conflicts. The most common are restrictions on the transfer of shares (e.g., the right of first refusal, consent clauses), special prerogatives for minority shareholders (e.g., veto rights over management decisions, super-majorities for fundamental corporate actions) and expulsion clauses, while more experienced players also recur to drag-along or tag-along arrangements, as well as to shoot-out procedures. The present article builds upon this framework in order to conduct probably the first thoroughly comparative law in action research on a representative data set of Italian private limited liability companies (srl) incorporated in South Tyrol and Milan. The empirical findings, with some unexpected variations between the two places of incorporation, suggest that with reference to conventional safeguards (the right of first refusal, consent clauses, etc.) a more or less significant degree of contractual sophistication can be observed, while innovative clauses such as tag-along or drag-along provisions are generally lacking. The explanation likely lies in the fact that legal advisers path-dependently imitate standardized corporate charter terms widely acknowledged and tested among the legal community rather than investing considerable efforts in the drafting of optimal customized arrangements. The social and economic costs correlated to sub-optimal and status quo-biased contractual design might not be taken into due consideration. This article also provides useful policy suggestions for the legislator and practitioners for the drafting of the best-fitting corporate charter.

中文翻译：

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理论与实践之间紧密公司中的股东冲突：来自意大利私人有限责任公司的证据

据说股东冲突是封闭公司的致命弱点。它们以不同的方式和形式出现，主要以多数人压迫、少数人滥用或股东僵局的形式出现。正如当前非常流行的行为法经济学运动所表明的那样，不同的认知偏见和启发式方法导致了它们的出现（例如过度乐观、战略行为、可用性和代表性启发式方法、信息不对称）。在国际公司法实践中，企业家根据要实现的具体治理目标，采取各种合同保障措施来有效预防和解决上述股东冲突。最常见的是对股份转让的限制（例如，优先购买权、同意条款）、少数股东的特殊特权（例如，对管理决策的否决权、对基本公司行为的绝对多数）和驱逐条款，而更有经验的参与者也会重复拖延或尾随安排，以及枪决程序. 本文以此框架为基础，以便对在南蒂罗尔和米兰注册的意大利私人有限责任公司 (srl) 的代表性数据集进行可能是第一次彻底的比较法行动研究。实证结果表明，在两个注册地之间存在一些意想不到的差异，表明参考传统的保障措施（优先购买权、同意条款等），可以观察到或多或少显着程度的合同复杂性，而诸如尾随或拖带条款等创新条款则普遍缺乏。可能的解释在于，法律顾问路径依赖地模仿在法律界广泛认可和测试的标准化公司章程条款，而不是在起草最佳定制安排方面投入大量精力。可能不会适当考虑与次优和偏向现状的合同设计相关的社会和经济成本。本文还为立法者和从业者起草最合适的公司章程提供了有益的政策建议。可能的解释在于，法律顾问路径依赖地模仿在法律界广泛认可和测试的标准化公司章程条款，而不是在起草最佳定制安排方面投入大量精力。可能不会适当考虑与次优和偏向现状的合同设计相关的社会和经济成本。本文还为立法者和从业者起草最合适的公司章程提供了有益的政策建议。可能的解释在于，法律顾问路径依赖地模仿在法律界广泛认可和测试的标准化公司章程条款，而不是在起草最佳定制安排方面投入大量精力。可能不会适当考虑与次优和偏向现状的合同设计相关的社会和经济成本。本文还为立法者和从业者起草最合适的公司章程提供了有益的政策建议。