We examine relations between strategic environmental policy, international R&D cartels and research joint ventures (RJVs), using a third-country model with Cournot duopoly. We indicate that forming an R&D/RJV cartel reduces governments' incentives to extract rent from consumers in the third country. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that social welfare under R&D cartels with full information sharing, i.e., RJV cartels, cannot surpass that under R&D/RJV competition, whereas forming an R&D/RJV cartel works well for environmental investment. Among the policy implications, we show that governments can maximize global welfare by collectively determining whether to allow R&D/RJV cartels.

中文翻译：

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国际研发结构和战略环境政策

我们使用具有古诺双头垄断的第三国模型来研究战略环境政策、国际研发卡特尔和研究合资企业 (RJV) 之间的关系。我们指出，形成 R&D/RJV 卡特尔会降低政府从第三国消费者那里榨取租金的动机。与传统观点相反，我们发现在完全信息共享的R&D卡特尔下，即RJV卡特尔下的社会福利无法超越R&D/RJV竞争下的社会福利，而组建R&D/RJV卡特尔则对环境投资有利。在政策影响中，我们表明政府可以通过共同决定是否允许研发/RJV 卡特尔来最大化全球福利。