ABSTRACT

This study investigates the associations between investment efficiency and both the existence of a board investment committee (IC) and its expertise. Using a sample of industrial firms from six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries across the 2005–2018 period, we find that IC existence reduces both under- and overinvestment by these firms. We also find that financial expertise among committee members affects firms’ investment efficiency positively. These findings are consistent with the assertion that ICs assist with the monitoring and control of firms’ investments. We also find that ICs reduce over- and underinvestment in firms with high levels of foreign ownership concentration. Our finding that reliance on an investment committee enhances investment efficiency is consistent with the tenets of agency theory in firms dominated by government and family ownership structures. These results are robust to a battery of additional tests that use alternative measures of investment efficiency, and to tests for self-selection bias and endogeneity.

摘要

这项研究调查了投资效率与董事会投资委员会（IC）的存在及其专业知识之间的关联。使用2005年至2018年期间来自六个海湾合作委员会（GCC）国家的工业公司的样本，我们发现IC的存在减少了这些公司的投资不足和过度投资。我们还发现，委员会成员中的财务专业知识对公司的投资效率产生积极影响。这些发现与IC有助于监视和控制公司投资的主张是一致的。我们还发现，IC减少了外资所有权集中度较高的公司的过度投资和投资不足。我们发现依赖投资委员会可以提高投资效率，这与以政府和家族所有制为主导的公司的代理理论相一致。这些结果对于使用附加投资效率度量方法的一系列附加测试以及自我选择偏见和内生性测试是可靠的。