ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of directors’ & officers’ (D&O) liability insurance on the number of key audit matters (KAMs) presented in the company’s financial statements, which are employed as a measure of the risk from the corporate governance of firms. Our empirical results show a significant positive relationship between the number of KAMs and the amount of D&O liability insurance. Our findings suggest that although D&O liability insurance may provide directors and supervisors with important protection, it may also lead to increased moral hazard. As a result, a relatively large number of KAMs are disclosed by the auditor in accordance with increased operating risk after the D&O liability insurance is purchased.

摘要

本文的目的是研究董事和高级职员（D＆O）责任保险对公司财务报表中列出的关键审计事项（KAM）数量的影响，这些审计事项被用来衡量公司的风险。公司治理。我们的经验结果表明，KAM数量与D＆O责任保险金额之间存在显着的正相关关系。我们的发现表明，尽管D＆O责任保险可以为董事和监事提供重要的保护，但也可能导致道德风险增加。结果，在购买D＆O责任保险后，审计员会根据增加的操作风险披露相对大量的KAM。