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Optimal mixed ownership: A contract view
Economics of Transition and Institutional Change Pub Date : 2019-10-01 , DOI: 10.1111/ecot.12237
Zheng Wang 1 , John S. Heywood 2 , Guangliang Ye 3, 4
Affiliation  

This paper reconsiders the classic issue of whether provision of a public good should be undertaken directly by the government or through private contracting (Hart, Andrei, & Robert, 1997). We consider a third alternative of provision by a mixed ownership firm. We assume that this mixed ownership firm provides the government principal with a combination of the contracting problems it faces in the two more extreme alternatives. We show that full government ownership and provision is never optimal and that frequently the mixed firm undertakes intermediate investments that also prove welfare superior to fully private contracting. These results carry over to an extension in which the agent is presumed to be a foreigner.

中文翻译:

最优混合所有权:合同观点

本文重新考虑了公共物品的提供应由政府直接进行还是由私人承包进行的经典问题(Hart,Andrei和Robert,1997)。我们考虑混合所有制公司提供拨备的第三种选择。我们假设这家混合所有制的公司为政府负责人提供了它在两个极端选择中所面临的承包问题的综合解决方案。我们证明,完全的政府所有权和供给永远不是最优的,而且混合公司经常进行中间投资,这也证明福利要优于完全私人承包。这些结果延续到假定代理人是外国人的范围。
更新日期:2019-10-01
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