Using a simple asymmetric capital-tax competition model where the allocation of mobile capital is distorted in non-cooperative equilibrium, this paper analyzes the welfare impact of regional tax coordination on a range of possible tax rates (a combination of maximum and minimum capital taxes made by a subset of regions). Under the assumption that the ownership of immobile factors (e.g., business land) is diversified across regions, a new possibility of beneficial coordination arises which has not been identified before: tax-range coordination “among capital-exporting regions” or “among capital-importing regions” may improve the welfare of all regions. This is in contrast to the case without cross-ownership where both capital-exporting and capital-importing regions must be involved in tax-range coordination in order to achieve a Pareto improvement.

本文使用简单的非对称资本税竞争模型，在此模型中，流动资本的分配在非合作均衡中被扭曲，本文分析了区域税收协调对一系列可能的税率（最大和最小资本税的组合）的福利影响。区域的子集）。假设不动产要素（例如商业用地）的所有权在各地区之间是多样化的，则出现了前所未有的有益协调的新可能性：税收范围在“资本输出地区之间”或“在资本输出地区之间”进口地区”可以改善所有地区的福利。这与没有交叉所有权的情况形成对照，在这种情况下，资本出口地区和资本进口地区都必须参与税收范围的协调，以实现帕累托改进。