This paper investigates how a tax revenue allocation rule determines the level of environmental taxation influenced by interest groups. A model of special interest politics is modified to incorporate environmental taxation. Two groups of agents exist. The first group earns wage income, has negative utility derived from pollution generated by energy consumption, and earns a profit share of the energy industry. The second group earns wages and has negative utility from pollution, but does not own shares. The government imposes an ad-valorem pollution tax and spends a proportion of its revenue as compensation for the tax burden on the first group and the remainder on public abatement. Two regimes are considered. First, a resource-rent group lobbies the government to protect its income source. Second, an environmentally conscious group lobbies the government to spend the revenue for pollution reduction. The critical proportion of transfer to tax revenue is derived to achieve the socially optimal rate of environmental taxation, even when the tax rate is subject to the influence of interest groups.

本文研究税收分配规则如何确定受利益群体影响的环境税收水平。修改了特殊利益政治模型，以纳入环境税收。存在两组代理。第一组赚取工资收入，因能源消耗产生的污染而产生负效用，并获得能源行业的利润份额。第二类人赚工资，并因污染而具有负效用，但没有股份。政府征收从价污染税，并将其收入的一部分用于补偿第一类人群的税负，其余部分用于公共减排。考虑了两种制度。首先，一个资源租赁组织游说政府以保护其收入来源。第二，一个有环保意识的团体游说政府将收入用于减少污染。即使税率受利益集团的影响，也可以得出转移到税收中的关键比例，以实现社会最优的环境税率。