There is extensive evidence on waste effects of environmental corruption in public works procurement. However, corruption is not the only source of waste. In this paper, we adopt a wider perspective and look at the environmental institutional quality, identifying the channels through which it can lead to different types of waste in public works execution. We firstly provide some empirical evidence on public works contracts managed by a large sample of Italian municipalities, showing that performance measures of public works execution are associated with the quality of local institutional environment in which they are executed. Motivated by this evidence, we develop a model where weak institutions entail low accountability of purchasing officers, thus they have low incentives to pursue the mandated task of monitoring the execution of contracts, even if no bribery occurs. Then, we assume that endemic environmental corruption increases the return of managerial effort devoted to rent-seeking activities for getting cost overruns, leading the contractor to divert effort from the productive activity. Overall, our model predictions conform well with the empirical evidence on Italian public works execution.

中文翻译：

---

当采购员换个角度看时：在公共工程执行过程中，当地环境的放荡对废物产生了影响

有大量证据表明公共工程采购中环境腐败产生了废物影响。但是，腐败不是浪费的唯一来源。在本文中，我们采用了更广阔的视角，着眼于环境制度质量，确定了其可能导致公共工程执行过程中产生不同类型废物的渠道。首先，我们提供了大量关于意大利市政当局管理的公共工程合同的经验证据，表明公共工程执行的绩效指标与执行它们的当地机构环境的质量有关。根据这些证据，我们建立了一个模型，在该模型中，薄弱的机构导致采购人员的问责制降低，因此他们缺乏动力去执行监督合同执行的任务，即使没有贿赂发生。然后，我们假设流行的环境腐败会增加用于寻租活动以获取成本超支的管理工作的回报，从而导致承包商将精力从生产活动中转移出来。总体而言，我们的模型预测与意大利公共工程执行的经验证据非常吻合。