This paper revisits the soft budget versus the hard budget constraint in federations. By extending Besfamille and Lockwood (Int Econ Rev 49:577–593, 2008), who examine a case where the soft budget is ex ante favorable, we consider a model that allows the federal government to use a matching grant as an ex post policy instrument. We establish that this instrument acts as a commitment device and may improve social welfare compared with the situation in which the government’s ex ante policy options are limited to a hard or soft budget.

中文翻译：

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具有重复的软预算设置的联邦模型中，将赠款作为承诺工具进行匹配的作用

本文回顾了联邦中的软预算与硬预算约束。通过扩展Besfamille和Lockwood（Int Econ Rev 49：577–593，2008）（他们研究了软预算是事前有利的情况），我们考虑了一种模型，该模型允许联邦政府将匹配的赠款用作事后政策。仪器。我们确定，与政府的事前政策选择仅限于硬预算或软预算的情况相比，该工具可以作为一种承诺手段，并可以改善社会福利。