The academic literature has long held that firms typically develop a system of incentives and rules that are meant to encourage employees to maximize their effort, and the firms’ profits. As a result, firms’ employees often rise through the ranks of the hierarchies in their firms through internal promotion, a process that results in the development of an internal labor market. This study explores the process of internal promotion, and its impact on firm behavior, with particular attention to both the Peter Principle and the Dilbert Principle. Both a formal model and a brief application of it to higher education are presented. In the case of the former, data related to U.S. business school deans indicate that more than one-third of all appointments come from internal candidates, with fully 20% of these being made from the rank-and-file professorate, thus supporting the model’s implications concerning the Peter Principle. Additionally, the data also reveal that the tenure of a typical “outside” dean exceeds that of a typical “inside” dean, thus supporting the model’s implications for the Dilbert Principle.

长期以来，学术文献一直认为，企业通常会建立一套激励机制和规则，以鼓励员工最大程度地努力并提高企业的利润。结果，公司的员工通常通过内部晋升而升格为公司中的层级，这一过程导致内部劳动力市场的发展。这项研究探讨了内部晋升的过程及其对公司行为的影响，并特别关注了彼得原理和迪尔伯特原理。同时介绍了正式模型及其在高等教育中的简要应用。就前者而言，与美国商学院院长有关的数据表明，所有任命中有三分之一以上来自内部候选人，其中有20％是由普通教授任命的，因此支持了该模型的任命。关于彼得原理的启示。此外，数据还显示，典型的“外部”教务长的任期超过了典型的“内部”教务长的任期，从而支持了模型对Dilbert原理的启示。