Studies of the line item veto have traditionally focused on whether it leads to less spending than an all-or-nothing veto and have only produced modest results. However, other impacts that differences in rule choice might effectuate have not been investigated in detail. We examine the role of veto rules for budgetary volatility, the extent to which expenditures vary. Theoretically, we model budget choices given all-or-nothing, line item, and item-reduction vetoes and demonstrate that more encompassing veto authority does not necessarily decrease spending but should result in more political gridlock, implying less volatility. We then analyze the model’s prediction by examining American state budget expenditures from 1978 to 2007. Whether one looks at budget categories or total spending, volatility is greater with the all-or-nothing veto relative to more stringent alternatives. Hence, delegating greater authority to executives such as governors, perhaps unexpectedly, likely strengthens expectations about future budgets while reducing the responsiveness of spending to changing preferences or circumstances.

传统上，对订单项否决权的研究关注的是，否决权导致的支出是否少于全有否决权，并且只产生了适度的结果。但是，尚未详细研究规则选择上的差异可能造成的其他影响。我们研究了否决权规则对预算波动的作用，支出变化的程度。从理论上讲，我们在给出全有或全无，否决项目和减少项目的否决权的情况下对预算选择进行建模，并证明拥有更多否决权的并不一定减少支出，但应导致更多的政治僵局，这意味着波动性较小。然后，我们通过检查1978年至2007年的美国州预算支出来分析模型的预测。无论是查看预算类别还是总支出，相对于更严格的选择，全有或全无的否决权会使波动性更大。因此，将更多的权力下放给州长等高管，可能会出乎意料，这可能会增强人们对未来预算的期望，同时降低支出对改变偏好或环境的反应。