Recent empirical evidence strongly points to the state-dependence of fiscal multipliers which are larger in recessions than in expansions. Yet, standard business cycle models face great difficulty in producing such asymmetric fiscal policy effects. By incorporating endogenously binding collateral constraints into a medium scale DSGE model, we find that fiscal effectiveness can vary substantially across the business cycle. The key to our framework is the state-dependent nature of collateral constraints; binding in bad times while slack in good times, amplifying the effectiveness of fiscal policy and hence generating fiscal multipliers that are larger during recessions.

中文翻译：

---

为什么财政乘数不对称？信用约束的作用

最近的经验证据强烈指出财政乘数对国家的依赖性，在衰退中比在扩张中更大。然而，标准的商业周期模型在产生这种不对称的财政政策效果方面面临很大困难。通过将内生约束抵押品约束纳入中等规模的 DSGE 模型，我们发现财政有效性在整个商业周期中可能会有很大差异。我们框架的关键是抵押品约束的国家相关性质；在经济不景气时有约束力，在景气时放松，从而放大财政政策的有效性，从而在经济衰退期间产生更大的财政乘数。